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Introduction
In Leibniz’s lifetime, the reception of his Theodicy (1710) in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands was generally speaking a warm one. For example, the book was reviewed quite 
sympathetically in key journals such as Nouvelles de la Republique des lettres1, Mémoires  
pour l’histoire des sciences & des beaux-arts 2, and Acta Eruditorum3. Moreover, the 
Theodicy garnered considerable praise from a number of learned figures across the continent, 
1* This paper was originally written for delivery at the Caroline bringt Leibniz nach London 
workshop of 24/25 July 2014, and benefitted greatly from the comments of those present. I 
would also like to thank Daniel J. Cook, Nora Gaedeke, Pauline Phemister, Julia Weckend, 
and the for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
 Nouvelles de la Republique des lettres (September 1710), pp. 314-342.
2 Mémoires pour l'histoire des sciences & des beaux-arts (July 1713), pp. 1178-1199.
3 Acta Eruditorum (March 1711), 110-21, and (April 1711), pp. 159-168.
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including Louis Bourguet4, Nicolas Malebranche5, and Bartholomew des Bosses6, with the 
latter even preparing a Latin translation from the original French to ensure the book enjoyed 
an even wider reach. Meanwhile, the broadly positive response from members of the main 
religions of continental Europe, namely the Lutheran, Calvinist and Catholic, led Leibniz to 
exclaim in 1712 that the Theodicy “is accepted by theologians of the three religions of the 
empire, with greater applause than I was expecting”7.
What, though, of its reception in England during Leibniz’s lifetime? This is the 
question with which we shall be concerned in this paper. As we shall see, the response in 
England was mixed, for while the Theodicy received positive reports in the journals, the 
reaction from key individuals was more lukewarm. When assessing the reception of the 
4 See Bourguet to Leibniz, 20 October 1712, GP III 556.
5 See Malebranche to Leibniz, 14 December 1711, GP I 358-9.
6 See des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 January 1711, GP II 414f. English translation: The Leibniz-
Des Bosses Correspondence, trans. and ed. B. C. Look and D. Rutherford (New Haven, 
2007), 191.
7 Leibniz to Friedrich Wilhelm Bierling, 14 January 1712, GP VII, 503. See also Leibniz to 
Christoph Joachim Nicolai von Greiffencrantz, 2 May 1715, GP VI, 12-13, and Leibniz to 
Philip Muller, 1711, durchgesehene Transkription, Akademie-Ausgabe Leibniz-Edition, 
Leibniz-Archiv / Leibniz-Forschungsstelle Hannover (Änderungen bis zur endgültigen 
Edition möglich), no. 306, p. 389, 
http://www.gwlb.de/Leibniz/Leibnizarchiv/Veroeffentlichungen/Transkriptionen1711.pdf 
(accessed 16 October 2014).
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Theodicy in England it is worth bearing in mind that there were factors present in England 
that were absent elsewhere in Europe. For example, the Theodicy contained a lengthy 
appendix (“Remarques sur le livre de l’Origine du mal, publié depuis peu en Angleterre”) 
devoted to a critical examination of De origine mali (1702) by William King, the Archbishop 
of Dublin8. Leibniz was himself concerned that his criticisms of the work of a senior 
Anglican figure had the potential to harm the reception of the Theodicy in England9. 
Moreover, in the final years of his life, Leibniz’s reputation in England was severely damaged 
by the priority dispute with Sir Isaac Newton over the invention of the calculus. This led in 
1712 to Leibniz’s condemnation as a plagiarist at the hands of Newton and the Royal Society 
(of which Newton was President), and thereafter to a bitter exchange of letters and pamphlets, 
the content and tone of which did little to help Leibniz’s cause in England. Nor, arguably, did 
Leibniz’s fractious exchanges with Newton’s friend and associate, Samuel Clarke, in 1715 
and 1716. (I note in passing that the Theodicy looms large over the Leibniz-Clarke 
8 At the time of writing the appendix, Leibniz was apparently unaware of King’s status within 
the Anglican Church, for upon the publication of the Theodicy he confided to one 
correspondent “I am afraid that it may fall into the hands of an Archbishop of the Anglican 
Church, namely Mr King, who published some years ago a book De origine mali. He was at 
that time Bishop of Derry, and I thought he still was, but I understand that he is now 
Archbishop of Dublin. I found myself more or less compelled to discuss his book and his 
opinion, and although I am not always of his mind, I hope I have written in a way that will 
not offend him.” Leibniz to Charles Ancillon, 12 December 1710, LBr. 12, Bl. 85.
9 Shortly before the book’s publication he expressed to Thomas Burnett his hope that the 
Theodicy “will not displease in England” especially on account of the appendix on De 
origine mali. See Leibniz to Burnett, 30 October 1710, Dutens VI:1, 285.
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correspondence10, for in the ten letters, five on each side, the Theodicy is explicitly mentioned 
nine times. On each occasion it is Leibniz who mentions it11; Clarke does not mention the 
book at all12, though some of the references he makes in his letters reveal an acquaintance 
with it13).
But perhaps an even more important factor in the English reception of the Theodicy 
was that, while Leibniz could count on a number of influential supporters in France, 
10 Although at the time Leibniz’s principal disagreement with Newton and his followers was 
squarely mathematical, on account of the priority dispute over the calculus, it has been 
suggested that he deliberately reframed it as a debate about natural religion and the content of 
the Theodicy – topics he knew to be close to the heart of Caroline, Princess of Wales – in 
order to win Caroline’s sympathies and support. See G. Brown: “‘[...] et je serai tousjours la 
même pour vous’: Personal, political, and the philosophical dimensions of the Leibniz-
Caroline correspondence”, in: Leibniz and His Correspondents, ed. P. Lodge (Cambridge, 
2004), pp. 274-275. Following this line of thinking, it is possible that Leibniz’s many 
references to the Theodicy in the letters to Clarke were aimed more at Caroline than they 
were at Clarke. Domenico Bertolini Meli seems to argue this way; see D. B. Meli: “Caroline, 
Leibniz, and Clarke”, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 60:3 (1999), p. 481, and D. B. Meli: 
“Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence”, in The Cambridge Companion to Newton, 
eds. I. B. Cohen and G. E. Smith (Cambridge, 2002), p. 459.
11 Leibniz refers to the Theodicy twice in his second letter to Clarke (GP VII 355, and 355-
356), once in his fourth letter (GP VII 372) and six times in his fifth letter (GP VII 389, 390, 
407, 409, 412, and 414).
12 Clarke’s failure to mention the Theodicy throughout the correspondence did not escape 
Leibniz’s attention; to one correspondent he complained that Clarke “has almost pretended to 
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Germany, and the Netherlands, the same was not true in England. This is clear from how and 
to whom the book was distributed there. Shortly before the publication of the Theodicy 
Leibniz took steps to ensure it would get into the hands of some of England’s intelligentsia, 
by instructing the book’s printer, Issac Troyel, to send copies to Thomas Burnett, John 
Toland, and Gilbert Burnet, the Bishop of Salisbury14. All were long-time acquaintances and 
correspondents of Leibniz’s; however, neither Burnett nor Toland could be considered 
especially influential (indeed, Toland was largely marginalised in England for his perceived 
atheist views), and while Burnet surely was influential, his correspondence with Leibniz had 
ended four years earlier, in 1706, so his favours could scarcely be relied upon. Leibniz’s list 
of English recipients of the Theodicy is in fact rather pitiable compared with his list of French 
recipients, which included royalty (the Dauphin, the Duke of Orleans), key journal editors 
(Abbé Bignon, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle15), and philosophers (Nicolas Malebranche, 
be unaware of my Theodicy.” Leibniz to Nicole Remond, 19 October 1716, GP III 678.
13 For example, in his first letter he refers to Leibniz’s description of God as a “supra-
mundane intelligence” (GP VII 354), which is to be found in Theodicy §217 (GP VI 248) but 
not in Leibniz’s first letter of the debate, to which Clarke is responding.
14 See Leibniz to J. W. Schele (after 21 October 1710), durchgesehene Transkription, 
Akademie-Ausgabe Leibniz-Edition, Leibniz-Archiv / Leibniz-Forschungsstelle Hannover 
(Änderungen bis zur endgültigen Edition möglich), no. 258, p. 287, 
http://www.gwlb.de/Leibniz/Leibnizarchiv/Veroeffentlichungen/Transkriptionen1710.pdf 
(accessed 25 October 2014).
15 Editors of the Journal des Sçavans and l’Histoire de l'Académie des Sciences de Paris 
respectively.
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Jacques LeLong16). No doubt in a concerted effort to ensure that the Theodicy reached at least 
some key English figures, Leibniz also asked Troyel to send six copies of the book to a 
friend, Johann Caspar von Bothmer, for him to distribute when he travelled to England17. This 
had a positive outcome in at least one case, for Bothmer gave one of his copies to John Sharp, 
the Archbishop of York, and Leibniz later discovered that Sharp had read the Latin appendix, 
the Causa Dei, and “approved it very much”18. Leibniz’s lack of what might be called “a 
friend in high places,” that is, a well-placed supporter in English circles who could assist him 
16 See Leibniz to C. R. Hasperg September 1711, durchgesehene Transkription, Akademie-
Ausgabe Leibniz-Edition, Leibniz-Archiv / Leibniz-Forschungsstelle Hannover (Änderungen 
bis zur endgültigen Edition möglich), no. 217, p. 269, 
http://www.gwlb.de/Leibniz/Leibnizarchiv/Veroeffentlichungen/Transkriptionen1711.pdf 
(accessed 25 October 2014).
17 See Leibniz to Isaac Troyel, 12 December 1710, durchgesehene Transkription, Akademie-
Ausgabe Leibniz-Edition, Leibniz-Archiv / Leibniz-Forschungsstelle Hannover (Änderungen 
bis zur endgültigen Edition möglich), no. 309, p. 357, 
http://www.gwlb.de/Leibniz/Leibnizarchiv/Veroeffentlichungen/Transkriptionen1710.pdf 
(accessed 25 October 2014).
18 Leibniz to Burnett, 18 October 1712, Dutens VI:1, 287/GP III 324. About a year later 
Leibniz informed Burnett that “The Archbishop of York has very much approved my book 
also,” though it is unclear whether Sharp’s approval now extended to the Theodicy as a whole 
(as Leibniz appears to suggest), or was still confined to the Causa Dei. Leibniz to Burnett, 23 
August 1713, Dutens VI:1, 291/GP III 329.
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with promoting and distributing the book, was to change following the Hanoverian 
succession, which led to one of his most enthusiastic supporters, Caroline of Ansbach, 
becoming the highest-ranking female royal in England following her investiture as Princess 
of Wales on 27 September 1714. By her own admission Caroline had read and approved the 
Theodicy19, a fact of which Leibniz did not tire repeating to his correspondents20. She also 
shared Leibniz’s desire that the book reach a wide audience and to that end made efforts to 
promulgate it herself, as we shall see later in the paper.
Another factor that likely impacted on the Theodicy’s reception in England was the 
lack of an English translation. Leibniz and Caroline were both aware of the need for one, and 
shared the desire to see an English translation made; this was in fact to become a recurring 
theme in their correspondence throughout 1715 and 1716. Much of their discussion 
concerned possible translators: Leibniz’s first suggestion was Michel de la Roche21, who was 
at the time editor of an English journal called Memoirs of Literature, about which I will have 
more to say in what follows. For her part, Caroline revealed that the Bishop of Lincoln had 
recommended Samuel Clarke as translator22; although the recommendation was made before 
Leibniz and Clarke began their correspondence, neither Caroline nor Leibniz was 
19 By her own admission; see for example Caroline to Leibniz, 30 December 1715/10 
January 1716, Klopp XI, 72.
20 See for example Leibniz to Count Bonneval, 21 September 1714, Klopp XI, 14-15. For 
further examples, see note 67.
21 Leibniz to Caroline, 29 March 1715, Klopp XI, 36.
22 Caroline to Leibniz, 3/14 November 1715, Klopp XI, 50.
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comfortable with the suggestion, because Clarke was a known associate and sympathiser of 
Newton, who was at that point highly antagonistic towards Leibniz because of the priority 
dispute. Both Leibniz and Caroline continued to discuss a possible English translation of the 
Theodicy until their correspondence was cut short by Leibniz’s death in November 171623.
There were, then, numerous factors that may have affected the reception of the 
Theodicy in England during Leibniz’s lifetime. Let us now examine this reception in greater 
detail. My thesis shall be the modest one mentioned earlier, that the reception of the Theodicy 
in England – from the time of its publication in 1710 to Leibniz’s death in 1716 – was a 
mixed one; while it received positive reports in the journals, the reaction from key individuals 
23 And of course, despite Leibniz’s wishes, and Caroline’s efforts, an English translation of 
the Theodicy was not to happen in his lifetime, and indeed, it did not happen until 1951, 
almost 250 years after Leibniz’s death. See Theodicy, trans. E. M. Huggard (London, 1951). 
It has been suggested that although Leibniz had a good working knowledge of English and 
was able to read English works, he was not sufficiently confident in his ability to write in the 
language (or therefore to translate into it himself). See N. Rescher: “Leibniz and the English 
language”, in: The Leibniz Review 23 (2013), pp. 7-11. This accords with Leibniz’s own 
assessment, as he explains to Thomas Burnett “I would like to have been capable of writing it 
[the Theodicy] in English, for the English are quite competent judges on these matters”. 
Leibniz to Thomas Burnett, 30 October 1710, Dutens VI:1, 285/GP III 322. There are some 
suggestions from Leibniz’s contemporaries that his knowledge of English may have been 
even better; for example, in his very first letter to Leibniz, John Toland writes “I take the 
liberty of writing to you in English, because you understand it as well as any liveing tongue 
besides yr own”. Toland to Leibniz, 6 October 1708, LBr 933 Bl.12. But while Toland always 
wrote to Leibniz in English, Leibniz always replied in French.
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was generally lukewarm. To show this, I shall focus first on the journal Memoirs of  
Literature, edited by Michel de la Roche, and second, on the report on the Theodicy prepared 
in 1715 by the Bishop of Bristol, George Smalridge.
Memoirs of Literature
We begin, then, with Michel de la Roche (c. 1680-1742), a French Huguenot who had 
settled in England at a young age. He became an Anglican in 1701 and went on to make his 
name as a journal editor, and it is in this role that he is of interest to us. In 1710 he started a 
journal entitled Memoirs of Literature, which ran from March 1710 to September 1714, and 
then again between January and April 171724. It is perhaps best described as a broadsheet than 
a journal, as each issue was printed on a single quarto sheet, though I shall continue to refer 
to it as a journal25. Each issue contained the following kinds of content:
1. Reports of non-English books; sometimes descriptive, and sometimes consisting 
entirely or almost entirely of extracts, translated into English
2. Letters (some anonymous, some credited)
3. Eulogies of important figures in the Republic of Letters
4. Information from the Republic of Letters
24 In 1725 de la Roche relaunched the journal as the New Memoirs of Literature, which ran 
until December 1727. In 1730 he tried again, this time publishing under the title A Literary 
Journal, or a Continuation of the Memoirs of Literature; this came to an end in 1731.
25 De la Roche typically refers to each individual issue as a “sheet”.
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5. Brief details of forthcoming books being published out of Europe’s major cities.
(Each issue contained one or more of 1 – 4, while all issues ended with 5.)
The focus of the journal was extremely broad: one finds in it reports on books on all 
manner of subjects, such as mathematics, theology, philosophy, anatomy, astronomy, China, 
botany, diseases, geography, and so on, though there is a clear bias in favour of theology. 
When leafing through, we find that Leibniz is very well represented, in fact more so than any 
other thinker, which gives some indication of the regard in which he was held by de la Roche. 
To be more specific:
The very first issue of the Memoirs, dated 13 March 1710, contains, on the final page, 
a notice of Leibniz’s forthcoming book. Under the heading “Amsterdam,” de la Roche writes 
that “’Tis said that a Book of M. Leibnitz, entitled, Essays concerning the Goodness of God,  
Free-Will, and the Origin of Evil, is to be printed here”26.
26 Memoirs of Literature I (13 March 1710), p. 4. This was not the earliest notice of the 
Theodicy, however, since the work had already been mentioned in the 17 February 1710 issue 
of the Journal des Sçavans, albeit again without mention of Theodicy as its title. The notice 
there reads: “A book should soon be printed which will have as its title, Essays on the 
Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, & the Origin of Evil. It is a work of Mr Leibniz, in 
which he undertakes to respond to the difficulties that Mr Bayle has formed on these three 
points of theology”. Journal des Sçavans (17 February 1710), p. 111. While the Memoirs of  
Literature correctly stated that the book was to be published in Amsterdam, the Journal des 
Sçavans mentioned only Holland.
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The fourth issue of the Memoirs is entirely devoted to a French book that de la Roche 
refers to as A Dissertation concerning the History of Balaam. The book itself consists of a 
number of essays, one by Leibniz on the history of Balaam (the Biblical prophet related in the 
book of Numbers), and the rest by Hermann von der Hardt on various other biblical figures. 
De la Roche provides English translations of Leibniz’s essay and one of those by von der 
Hardt27. Although Leibniz is not mentioned by name as the author of the Balaam essay, de la 
Roche does state that it had been written by “a Gentleman of that Countrey [Germany], 
Famous for his Universal Knowledge”28, which suggests he knew it was Leibniz.
The 43rd issue of the Memoirs is entirely devoted to the first volume of the 
Miscellanea Berolinensia (1710), the journal of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, which 
Leibniz had edited29. De la Roche gives a general overview of the contents of the journal, 
with most of the report focusing on Leibniz’s many contributions, in particular his essay on 
the origin of languages, his essay on the origin of phosphorous, his letter to Spener about a 
crocodile fossil, and a number of essays on mathematical topics.
27 Later issues of the journal contained translations of parts of two more of von der Hardt’s 
essays from this book: translated extracts from an essay on the jawbone of an ass that Samson 
used to kill Philistines can be found in Memoirs of Literature VI (17 April 1710), pp. 23-24, 
while those from an essay on Elijah’s ravens can be found in Memoirs of Literature VII (24 
April 1710), pp. 25-26.
28 Memoirs of Literature IV (3 April 1710), p. 13.
29 Memoirs of Literature XLIII (1 January 1711), pp. 169-171.
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Issue 60 is the first of four devoted to the Theodicy30. In this issue, de la Roche 
focuses on the preface to the Theodicy, and his report alternates between describing the 
contents of the book, and quoting long passages from it.
Issue 61 is the second of the four devoted to the Theodicy31. This time the focus is the 
preliminary discourse, and again the report contains both exposition and long quotations.
Issue 65 is the third of four devoted to the Theodicy32. The focus here is on Leibniz’s 
explanations for the origin of evil.
Issue 66 is the fourth on the Theodicy33. In this issue, de la Roche paraphrases the 
mythical account of Pallas and Theodorus that closes the Theodicy34.
It is worth noting that de la Roche’s keenness to promote Leibniz’s work did not stop 
at printing reports on and extracts from the Theodicy: in later issues of the Memoirs of  
Literature he included English translations of some letters exchanged between Leibniz and 
30 Memoirs of Literature LX (30 April 1711), pp. 237-239.
31 Memoirs of Literature LXI (7 May 1711), pp. 241-243.
32 Memoirs of Literature LXV (11 June 1711), pp. 257-259.
33 Memoirs of Literature LXV (18 June 1711), pp. 261-263.
34 In addition to the extracts from the Theodicy translated by de la Roche, further translated 
extracts were later made (this time by Samuel Clarke) for the appendix to A Collection of  
Papers which Passed between the Late Learned Mr. Leibnitz, and Dr. Clarke, in the Years  
1715 and 1716 (London, 1717), pp. 375-399.
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Nikolaus Hartsoeker35, an English translation of Leibniz’s essay entitled “Philosophical 
reflections occasioned by some letters published at Trevoux in 1703”, first published in the 
Journal de Trévoux36, and a further short extract from the Theodicy on the subject of 
witchcraft37. De la Roche was clearly an admirer of Leibniz’s: no other thinker was discussed 
so often in the Memoirs, or given as many column inches as he was.
35 Memoirs of Literature (2ed), 4 (1722), pp. 452-467 and 5 (1722), pp. 62-64. The letters in 
question had first been published in the Memoires pour l’histoire des sciences & des beaux 
Arts [a.k.a. Journal de Trévoux] 12 (1712), pp. 494-512, and pp. 676-679. In one of these 
letters Leibniz had attacked the notion of action at a distance that he attributed to Newtonians, 
and the publication of this letter in the Memoirs attracted the ire of Newton, who wrote a 
vindication of his position and sent it to de la Roche, requesting that it too be published in the 
Memoirs. It was not, however, published there. See Newton to the editor of the Memoirs of  
Literature, c. May 1712, in: I. Newton, Philosophical Writings, ed. A. Janiak (Cambridge, 
2004), pp. 114-117.
36 Memoirs of Literature (2ed), 5 (1722), pp. 273-276.
37 Memoirs of Literature (2ed), 4 (1722), pp. 387-388.
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It is clear that de la Roche had a high regard for the Theodicy in particular38. In the 
first of his four reports on the book he explains that it deals with some of the most important 
topics in philosophy and divinity, and was written by a man “eminently qualified” to treat of 
them39. (It is interesting to note that throughout the reports on the Theodicy, Leibniz’s name is 
never mentioned; instead, de la Roche refers to the author as “Theodicaeus”40. However there 
38 Only Richard Simon’s Bibliotheque critique, ou recueil de diverses pieces critiques, 4 
vols. (Amsterdam 1708-1710) enjoyed a more extensive treatment, being the focus of no 
fewer than seven issues of the Memoirs of Literature, namely: XXXV (6 November 1710), 
pp. 137-40; XXXVI (13 November 1710), pp. 142-144; XXXVII (20 November 1710), pp. 
145-148; XXXVIII (27 November 1710), pp. 149-152; LXII (14 May 1711), pp. 245-248; 
LXXIV (13 August 1711), pp. 293-296; and LXXXII (8 October 1711), pp. 325-328. But one 
should bear in mind that while there were four volumes of Simon’s book, there was only one 
of the Theodicy.
39 Memoirs of Literature LX (30 April 1711), p. 237.
40 He was not the only reviewer to do this: Jacques Bernard referred to Leibniz as 
“Theodicée” throughout his review of the book in the Nouvelles de la Republique des lettres. 
However, in Bernard’s case this appears to have been a case of mistaking the title of the book 
for the pseudonym of its author, for he writes: “The renowned author speaks so often of his 
other productions, to which he refers the reader, that one would have to be a foreigner in the 
Republic of Letters not to recognize who he is when one reads this new book. However, as he 
has not deemed it appropriate to put his name to it, and as he has adopted that of Theodicée, 
we shall call him by that name”. Nouvelles de la Republique des lettres (September 1710), 
pp. 314-342, at p. 314. The second part of Bernard’s review was published the following 
14
is little doubt that he knew of Leibniz’s authorship41). In the third report, de la Roche outlines 
the long-standing difficulties about the origin of evil which Leibniz tackles in the Theodicy, 
and informs the reader that Leibniz, “far from being afraid of sinking under the Weight of 
those Difficulties, discovers a sort of Confidence not unbecoming so great a Philosopher” in 
framing his answer42. He goes on to praise Leibniz’s reconciliation of human freedom and 
month: (October 1710), pp. 363-396.
41 Quite why de la Roche credited the Theodicy to Theodicaeus is something of a mystery. It 
is certainly true that the first edition of the Theodicy did not carry Leibniz’s name, but it is 
scarcely credible that de la Roche did not know that Leibniz was its author. As already noted, 
the very first issue of the Memoirs of Literature had carried an announcement of Leibniz’s 
book, credited to Leibniz; moreover, in the first report of the book from issue 60, de la Roche 
describes the Theodicy’s author thus: “Theodicaeus, tho’ a Lay-man, is well skill’d in 
Divinity. He is an Excellent Philosopher, a Mathematician of the first Rank, a good 
Philologer, well vers’d in History and the Learned Languages; in a word, there is hardly any 
Man of a more Solid and Universal Learning”. Memoirs of Literature LX (30 April 1711), p. 
237. It is scarcely credible that de la Roche would have offered such a detailed description – 
which quite obviously picks out Leibniz – if he had not known who the author was. In all 
likelihood, de la Roche knew all along that Leibniz was the author of the Theodicy, but 
because the book was published anonymously he decided not to reveal the author’s identity in 
his reports on it, even though he had to all intents and purposes already done so many months 
earlier when announcing the forthcoming appearance of the book. In any case, when the first 
run of issues of the Memoirs of Literature was subsequently reprinted in 1722, de la Roche 
replaced all references to “Theodicaeus” with either Leibniz’s name, or “the author”.
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God’s foreknowledge43. The fourth report begins with praise about the clarity of Leibniz’s 
explanations, and his ability to express himself in a popular manner44. There is in the whole 
series of reports on the Theodicy just a single moment when de la Roche indicates possible 
disagreement: at the end of the third report he says that Leibniz’s treatment of the topics of 
Election and Reprobation “perhaps will not appear so satisfactory as several others”45, though 
no reason for this apparent disapproval is given.
One can only imagine that Leibniz would have been thrilled with the reports of his 
book in the Memoirs. Unfortunately, however, his knowledge of them was very much 
imperfect. It was only in late 1712 that Leibniz became aware that the Memoirs had included 
reports on the Theodicy, after having been informed of it in person by Samuel Urlsperger, a 
Lutheran preacher who had spent time in London. Later, in January 1713, and at Leibniz’s 
request46, Urlsperger copied out part of the first report on the Theodicy (from issue 60 of the 
Memoirs47). While this would have given him some idea of what the journal had done, as far 
42 Memoirs of Literature LXV (11 June 1711), p. 257.
43 Memoirs of Literature LXV (11 June 1711), p. 259.
44 Memoirs of Literature LXV (18 June 1711), p. 261.
45 Memoirs of Literature LXV (11 June 1711), p. 259.
46 See Samuel Urlsperger to Leibniz, 4 January 1713, LBr 948 Bl. 1-2. I would like to thank 
Julia Weckend for transcribing and translating Urlsperger’s letter for me.
47 See Samuel Urlsperger to Leibniz, 4 January 1713, LBr 948 Bl. 3-4.
16
as I can tell Leibniz did not get to see any of the issues of the Memoirs of Literature, and so 
was almost certainly unaware of the extent of the attention he had received in it, as well as 
the extent of de la Roche’s admiration of him48.
It happens that the Memoirs of Literature also provided the occasional cause for 
Leibniz’s initial desire to have the Theodicy translated into English. To understand this, we 
need to consider issue 61 of the journal, and specifically de la Roche’s quotation of §18 of the 
Preliminary Discourse to Leibniz’s Theodicy:
“Theodicaeus informs us, that the Lutherans ‘do not approve the Doctrine of Consubstantiation or Impanation, 
and that it cannot be ascribed to them, but by those who are not well acquainted with their Opinion: For they do 
not admit the Inclusion of the Body of Christ in the Bread, nor any Union between both, but only a 
Concomitancy, whereby those Two substances are received at the same time’”49.
48 Though Leibniz was at least informed that de la Roche was an admirer. For example, 
Brandshagen advised him that “Mons. de la Roche is the gentlemen who writes the Memoirs 
of Lithiature, and who has a great veneration for your Excellency”. Elisabeth Brandshagen to 
Leibniz, 18 April 1714, durchgesehene Transkription, Akademie-Ausgabe Leibniz-Edition, 
Leibniz-Archiv / Leibniz-Forschungsstelle Hannover (Änderungen bis zur endgültigen 
Edition möglich), no. 137, p. 164, 
http://www.gwlb.de/Leibniz/Leibnizarchiv/Veroeffentlichungen/Transkriptionen1714.pdf 
(accessed 25 October 2014).
49 Memoirs of Literature LXI (7 May 1711), p. 242. I here give the passage following de la 
Roche’s own translation. The original passage from the Theodicy can be found GP VI, 60-61.
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Leibniz was made aware of this passage by Urlsperger and became concerned that the 
Anglican attacks on the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist were politically motivated, being 
undertaken by those opposed to the Hanoverian succession50. A passage from Leibniz’s letter 
to Thomas Burnett of 18 October 1712 is very instructive and worth quoting at length:
“A young German theologian who returned from England told me that the author of Memoirs of Literature has 
made a review of my Theodicy, and very aptly remarked, among other things, that I have corrected the mistake 
that the (ill-informed) Reformers ordinarily make about those of the Augsburg Confession, in attributing to them 
a consubstantiation of terrestrial symbols with the body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist, or rather an 
impanation; whereas I made it clear that our theologians require only a comperception, such that when one 
receives a terrestrial thing, one receives the celestial at the same time, without any inclusion of the body of Jesus 
Christ in the bread. The same young theologian told me that some of your Anglican Church objected to him that 
we have an impanation and consubstantiation, which is scarcely better than the transubstantiation of the Papists. 
But he referred them to my book and to the Memoirs of Literature. I think that this accusation presently being 
made against our side comes from the bad intention of those who favour the Papists and the Pretender, and who 
would like to blacken our name. This is why it would perhaps be good for my book to be translated into 
English51”.
50 Leibniz was apparently unaware that the same passage from the Theodicy was quoted again in a later issue 
of the Memoirs of Literature. In 1713, de la Roche included a report of a book entitled Remarks upon a late  
Discourse of Free-Thinking, which as its title suggests was a response to Anthony Collins’ A Discourse of Free-
Thinking. In the course of his report, de la Roche quoted a short passage from Collins about the Lutheran 
doctrine of the Eucharist: “The Lutheran Priests ... contrary to the Testimony of Mens Senses, make their 
Followers believe, that the Body and Blood of Christ are superadded to the Bread and Wine”. (A. Collins, A 
Discourse of Free-Thinking (London, 1713), pp. 24-25.) Immediately after quoting that, de la Roche reminded 
his readers of a passage from §18 of the Preliminary Discourse to Leibniz’s Theodicy that he had quoted in issue 
61, before proceeding to repeat it verbatim. See Memoirs of Literature (2ed) 6 (1722), pp. 182-183.
51 Leibniz to Thomas Burnett, 18 October 1712, Dutens VI:1, 286-287.
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An English translation of the Theodicy was not the only proposal Leibniz put forward 
for defending the intelligibility of the Lutheran position on the Eucharist (and thereby shoring 
up the Hanoverian succession). In a letter to Sophie written 4 March 1713, he explains that a 
passage from the Theodicy was quoted in the Memoirs of Literature to clear up the confusion 
surrounding the Lutheran doctrine on the Eucharist, and then makes the following 
recommendation:
“It will perhaps be fitting if a theologian of ours puts together a small work in order to justify my explanation, 
and to show through passages from our most renowned theologians that we have always rejected this doctrine of 
impanation, or consubstantiation52”.
Leibniz goes on to recommend the superintendent of Harburg, Heinrich Ludolf 
Benthem, for the task (“because he knows the English”53), though like so many of Leibniz’s 
plans it appears it was never carried out. Nevertheless, two years later Leibniz effectively 
completed the task himself, in a pamphlet called Anti-Jacobite, which he published 
anonymously in 171554. The aim of the pamphlet was to defend the Hanoverian succession 
52 Leibniz to Sophie, 4 March 1713, LBr 948 Bl. 5.
53 Leibniz to Sophie, 4 March 1713, LBr 948 Bl. 5.
54 [G. W. Leibniz]: Anti-Jacobite ou Faussetés de l’Avis aux proprietaires anglois 
([Hanover], 1715). It is reprinted in Dutens V, 575-604. As the pamphlet was published 
anonymously, Leibniz responded with calculated bewilderment to those who suspected it to 
be his work. For example, he writes one correspondent “I am astonished that the Anti-
Jacobite, which was not published at Hanover, has been attributed to me.” Leibniz to Johann 
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against various possible Jacobite objections, one of which was that George I, as a Lutheran, 
would hold a very different view of the Eucharist than would an Anglican. In the Anti-
Jacobite pamphlet Leibniz responded thus: “One ought to be aware that the theologians of the 
Augsburg Confession reject – openly and in express terms – any impanation and any 
transubstantiation of the body and blood of Jesus Christ55”. To support this claim, the Anti-
Jacobite pamphlet urged the reader to consult an issue of the Memoirs of Literature, namely 
the one that contained the extract from the Theodicy on this subject56. So in the end Leibniz 
surreptitiously used his own work as the authority on the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist 
rather than that of Lutheran theologians!
By way of a slight digression, it is worth noting that Leibniz’s perceived need to 
defend the Hanoverian succession even after George I had taken the throne may go some way 
towards explaining why he came to propose an English translation of the Theodicy to 
Philip Schmid, 4 July 1715, Dutens V, 532. According to Dutens, however, there is little 
doubt about Leibniz’s authorship. See also N. Harding: Hanover and the British Empire,  
1700-1837 (Woodbridge, 2007), pp. 50f.
55 Anti-Jacobite, Dutens V, 594.
56 Or at least, that presumably was his aim. If so, Leibniz’s reference was wrong. He wrote: 
“For clarification on this, one has only to see the Memoirs of Literature of Mr de la Roche, 
vol. I num. LX page 237.” Anti-Jacobite, Dutens V, 594. This in fact points the reader to the 
first report of the Theodicy in the Memoirs of Literature, whereas the material about the 
Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist is to be found in the second report, that is, issue LXI (7 
May 1711), p. 242.
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Caroline57. It is notable that Leibniz’s first thought as a translator is de la Roche. He writes 
Caroline on 29 March 1715:
“To translate my book into English, I think Mr de la Roche would be appropriate. He is a Minister, a refugee, 
who has put together in England a kind of journal entitled Memoirs of Literature. It is true that I would prefer an 
Anglican theologian to undertake the translation58”.
The suggestion is a shrewd one, since an Anglican theologian as translator would 
effectively suggest Anglican approval of the work59. However the wish is not repeated in the 
57 It is also possible that Leibniz had a less honourable motive for desiring the translation 
made. By his own admission it is clear that he desired the position of court historiographer in 
England in order to boost – in the midst of the priority dispute – his own honour along with 
that of Hanover and Germany, and in order that he might be perceived to be Newton’s equal. 
See Leibniz to Caroline, 10 May 1715, Klopp XI, 38. It would no doubt be possible to build a 
narrative in which his stated desire over the last two years of his life for an English 
translation of the Theodicy was motivated by similar aims, especially since the plan was to 
have it dedicated to Caroline, who was at that time the highest ranking female royal in 
Britain. But I make no such claim here.
58 Leibniz to Caroline, 29 March 1715, Klopp XI, 36.
59 It is not entirely clear from Leibniz’s remark whether he takes de la Roche to be suitable 
as translator because he is an Anglican theologian, or whether he thinks an Anglican 
theologian would be preferable to de la Roche. I am inclined to the former interpretation 
(since de la Roche certainly was an Anglican, and Leibniz clearly thought he was a Minister, 
even though he was not); Gregory Brown appears to endorse the latter; see his “‘[...] et je 
21
subsequent discussions between Caroline and Leibniz about the possible translation of the 
Theodicy, nor indeed is de la Roche’s name, though Leibniz evidently kept him in mind, since 
in December 1715 he tells another correspondent that de la Roche is still his first choice as 
translator, so long as his English is up to the task60.
To return to the thread of the discussion: it was suggested earlier that the English 
journal reports on the Theodicy were very positive, and we have seen that this was certainly 
the case with the Memoirs of Literature. As it happens, in England at the time this was the 
only journal that would have concerned itself with the Theodicy. Of the other journals, the 
Philosophical Transactions was concerned with natural philosophy, which is not the subject 
matter of the Theodicy, and The Spectator didn’t include reviews of books. So the Theodicy 
got about as much attention (and by extension, positive attention) from the English journals 
as it could have done.
In addition to receiving positive write-ups in journals, Leibniz clearly wanted the 
Theodicy to be accepted and admired by Anglican churchmen and other notable figures in 
England. He was even active in getting copies of the book to them: we have already noted 
that he had Bothmer take copies of the Theodicy with him to England, to distribute to key 
figures. Leibniz’s efforts paid off, to some extent at least. Although some of those from 
serai tousjours la même pour vous’”, p. 273.
60 “I do not know whether the Frenchman Mr de la Roche (who has written the Memoirs of  
Literature in English) writes English well enough in the judgement of connoisseurs for the 
task [of translation] to be entrusted to him. If he does, I think he would be the man to take it 
on”. Leibniz to Nicole Remond, 6 December 1715, Dutens III, 449. Leibniz goes on to 
suggest the theologian and linguist William Wotton (1666-1727) as a possible alternative.
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whom he desired feedback, such as Gilbert Burnet61, and the philosopher Catharine Trotter62, 
appear not to have provided any, nevertheless, as we have already seen, he was made aware 
in 1712 that the Archbishop of York, John Sharp, had formed a favourable opinion of the 
book, or at least of the appendix, the Causa Dei. And in the last year of his life Leibniz was 
also informed that the Bishop of Lincoln, William Wake, admired the book63. But as far as 
one can tell, neither of these divines made any kind of in-depth study of the book, or 
produced written comments on it, which is ultimately, one feels, what Leibniz was hoping for. 
And ironically, the one divine that did go to the trouble of making written comments on the 
book, namely George Smalridge, the Bishop of Bristol, was also the most critical. It is to him 
that we now turn.
61 See Leibniz to Burnett, 18 October 1712, Dutens VI:1, 287/GP III, 324.
62 Leibniz does not mention Trotter by name. Instead he writes: “This young lady, whose 
Apology for Mr Locke you have mentioned to me, would also be in a very good position to 
form a judgement of it [sc. the Theodicy], if she understands French”. Leibniz to Burnett, 30 
October 1710, Dutens VI:1, 285/GP III 322. Leibniz is referring here to Trotter’s A Defence 
of Mr. Lock’s Essay of Human Understanding (London, 1702).
63 See Caroline to Leibniz, 30 December 1715/10 January 1716, Klopp XI, 72, and Caroline 
to Leibniz 15/26 June 1716, Klopp XI, 115. Wake became Archbishop of Canterbury in 
December 1715. There was little direct communication between Leibniz and Wake, just a 
single letter written by Leibniz shortly before his death, and the Theodicy is not mentioned in 
it. See Leibniz to Wake, 16 October 1716, Göttingen StUB Ms.Phil. 138 Bl. 110-111.
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Bishop of Bristol
There appears to have been no direct communication between Smalridge and Leibniz. 
Smalridge’s report on the Theodicy was sent not to Leibniz but to Caroline, in a letter of 4 
March 1715. At the start of his letter, Smalridge outlines the circumstances that led him to 
write it. Evidently Caroline had given Smalridge a copy of the Theodicy while he was in 
London, and she had asked him for his views on it. Shortly after he returned to his home in 
Oxford, Smalridge obliged with a letter containing his opinion of Leibniz’s book.64 It is also 
clear that Caroline forwarded Smalridge’s letter on to Leibniz, because he responded to it in a 
letter to her of 29 March 171565. In what follows we shall look at Smalridge’s letter in some 
detail, as well as Leibniz’s response to it.
Although Smalridge does offer some praise for the Theodicy, as we shall see, it is 
rather faint and guarded, and much of his letter is devoted to criticisms, though it is notable 
that his criticisms are not so much about the book’s philosophical or theological content as 
about its stylistic features66. In his letter, Smalridge notes early on that Caroline herself has 
complained that the Theodicy is obscure (and it also seems that she had not been shy about 
64 This letter is published for the first time in an appendix to this paper.
65 Leibniz’s letter of 29 March 1715 can be found in Klopp XI, 35-36. However, enclosed 
with the letter was a separate appendix containing a point-by-point rebuttal of Smalridge’s 
criticisms; this is not published in Klopp.
66 It might be wondered whether Smalridge’s negative verdict of the Theodicy may have 
been motivated, at least in part, by the priority dispute, which did wonders to blacken 
Leibniz’s name in England, but I have found no evidence to suppose that it was.
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who she told, as Smalridge claims to have heard this from Lady Nottingham67). When writing 
his own opinion on the Theodicy, Smalridge may well have been consciously or 
unconsciously guided by what he took to be Caroline’s view; certainly of the six negative 
comments Smalridge goes on to make in his letter, five seem intended to support Caroline’s 
assessment that the book is obscure, with only one making a different point.
Smalridge’s first complaint is that in the Theodicy Leibniz uses a great many 
Scholastic terms, such as absolute and hypothetical necessity, and the consequent and 
antecedent will of God. Such terms, Smalridge claims, are “mere jargon, empty words 
without any meaning, and utterly unintelligible”68.
The second complaint is that Leibniz “hath also inserted several citations, from Greek 
& Latin authors, which he hath not translated into the language in which he writes, & which 
therefore a reader, who is not acquainted with Greek & Latin, can make nothing of”69.
67 It is not unreasonable to suppose that Leibniz may have been surprised – and perhaps hurt 
– to hear that Caroline found the Theodicy obscure. He was often keen to inform 
correspondents that Caroline had read the Theodicy repeatedly, and had approved it. It is 
notable that Leibniz continued to make these claims to correspondents even after learning 
that Caroline found the Theodicy obscure. See for example Leibniz to Bourguet, 3 April 
1716, GP III 593: “You are right to think, Sir, that Madam the Princess of Wales must have a 
wonderfully elevated mind, since she goes so deeply into matters so sublime. To confirm this 
I will tell you that she has read the Theodicy more than once, and with appreciation, and that 
she laughed at those who had wanted to turn her away from this reading under the pretext that 
things in it were too abstract”. See also Leibniz to Christian Wolff, 23 December 1715, in: 
Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Chr. Wolf, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Halle, 1860), pp. 180-181.
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The third complaint is that Leibniz often makes use of examples from mathematics or 
the sciences, which are not helpful to anyone unschooled in those subjects:
“The author doth in severall places illustrate what he delivers by similitudes or examples, taken from 
mathematics or naturall philosophy; which resemblances, tho’ to persons skill’d in those sciences they may 
make the matters treated of clearer, yet to others unacquainted with those parts of learning, or who have not 
searcht into the depths of them, they must necessarily render what is said rather more, than less, obscure70”.
Smalridge’s fourth complaint about the Theodicy is that Leibniz apparently expects 
the reader to be familiar with, and have access to, his past output, as he often alludes to his 
previously-published works:
“The author doth in severall places allude to books, which he had before publish’d, & which he supposes the 
reader of this to be well acquainted with; but it may happen that some readers may have never seen, or never 
68 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 2v. It is notable that, in his fifth letter 
to Leibniz (probably written after Leibniz’s death), Samuel Clarke also complained about 
Leibniz’s use of the term “hypothetical necessity”: “Necessity, in Philosophical Questions, 
always signifies absolute Necessity. Hypothetical Necessity, and Moral Necessity, are only 
Figurative Ways of Speaking, and in Philosophical strictness of Truth, are no Necessity at 
all”. GP VII, 423.
69 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 2v and 3r
70 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 3r.
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consider’d those former discourses of his, & therefore may be the less prepar’d, & the less able to understand 
what is advanced in this71”.
The suggestion that Leibniz alludes in the Theodicy to his previously-published books 
is clearly overdrawn, but he certainly does refer to a number of his journal articles.
Smalridge’s fifth complaint is that the Theodicy suffers from too many digressions:
“The author hath in the prosecution of this subject made many, & sometimes very long digressions, which tho’ 
in themselves perhaps very usefull & instructive, yet, as they are brought in here, do interrupt the thread of the 
discourse, & thereby make it more difficult for the reader to carry on the pursuit of the principall subject in his 
thoughts72”. 
For all five of these reasons, according to Smalridge, the Theodicy, or at least great 
parts of it, will appear to many readers as “difficult and obscure”73. It is unclear whether this 
is how Smalridge himself sees the book, or whether he is just seeking to support Caroline’s 
assessment that the book is obscure. Nevertheless, he goes on to say that readers who pay 
careful attention – and presumably that includes him (and Caroline!) – will find in the 
Theodicy many excellent thoughts, great erudition, solid reasoning and judgement, and a true 
spirit of piety. Smalridge is short on specifics here; of all the issues Leibniz addresses in the 
Theodicy, Smalridge mentions only that of whether evil can be an objection to God’s 
71 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 3v.
72 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 3v.
73 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 4r.
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goodness and holiness. On this matter, Smalridge claims that Leibniz’s assertions will 
“appear satisfactory to all unprejudic’d and well-disposed minds”74, although he also notes 
that there may still be objections that can be raised to which Leibniz has no adequate 
response. He explains that this is not because opponents have the better arguments, merely 
that in our current state of imperfection it is impossible to clear away all conceivable doubts 
that may be raised in the matter. However, Smalridge does state that “the objection against 
the goodness of God drawn from the permission of evil” has been “consider’d, and answer’d 
by Archbishop Tillotson” in one of his sermons (namely that on “The goodness of God”75). 
Although he does not say it outright, Smalridge is clearly comparing Leibniz’s treatment of 
evil in the Theodicy with that of Tillotson in his sermon, and intimating that, of the two, 
Tillotson’s is the stronger. The comparison is certainly not unreasonable; indeed, there is 
much overlap between Tillotson’s explanation for evil and Leibniz’s. Tillotson claims, for 
example, that all created things are necessarily imperfect, but that it is good that there be a 
great variety of them76; he says also that our sufferings are either the effects of our own sin, or 
are divine punishments for them77, and that nevertheless, sufferings contribute to the increase 
74 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 4v.
75 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 4v and 5r. Tillotson’s sermon is based on Psalm 145.9, 
and can be found in J. Tillotson, The Remaining Discourses, on the Attributes of God, 7 vols. (London, 1700), 
VII: pp. 51-80.
76 Tillotson, The Remaining Discourses, VII: p. 58.
77 Tillotson, The Remaining Discourses, VII: p. 62.
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of our happiness78. All these are doctrines one can also find in the Theodicy. Yet as befits 
a churchman, Tillotson spends most of his time not with theoretical explanations of why 
God would allow evil, as Leibniz arguably does; instead, Tillotson is especially 
concerned to show that certain events recorded in the Bible, such as the universal deluge, 
the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the extermination of Canaanites and the 
destruction of Rome, are not objections to God’s goodness (as they might initially appear 
to be) so much as evidence of that goodness in action79. Leibniz does no such thing in the 
Theodicy: he is concerned with the more abstract question of why God would have 
permitted evil at all rather than the more concrete one of why the Christian God would 
have carried out specific actions which superficially look to be evil in nature80. Possibly 
this is why Smalridge – no doubt approaching the issue from a churchman’s perspective 
rather than a metaphysician’s – offers Leibniz only guarded praise, and shows a marked 
preference for Tillotson over Leibniz in the matter of God’s goodness in the face of evil.
78 Tillotson, The Remaining Discourses, VII: p. 65.
79 Tillotson, The Remaining Discourses, VII: pp. 71-80.
80 The closest he comes is in Theodicy §275 (GP VI, 281), where he examines scriptural 
passages which might initially suggest that God commits evil rather than just permits it. 
But nowhere in the book does he consider biblical events such as God’s destruction of 
Sodom and Gomorrah, the extermination of Canaanites etc., and so he does not attempt to 
show how such God’s bringing about such events might be consistent with his goodness.
Following his praise for Tillotson, Smalridge indicates some disapproval of the 
efforts of Leibniz (and others) to show how God and evil could co-exist, which we might 
take to be his sixth and final complaint about the Theodicy. Smalridge claims that even 
though Leibniz and others have some measure of success in showing how the existence 
of evil may be consistent with God’s goodness and holiness,
“[...] still there may remain some difficulties not to be solv’d whilst we are in this state of imperfection, but 
reserv’d, till we are translated to a state of greater illumination.
In the mean-time it will become all humble, serious, & sober-minded Christians, rather to apply themselves 
to the diligent & conscientious practise of known duties, than to perplex their minds with an over-curious 
search into hidden & mysterious truths81”.
In other words, one’s energies should be directed into one’s Christian duties rather 
than the sort of metaphysical speculation found throughout the Theodicy (and to a lesser 
extent, in Tillotson’s sermon on God’s goodness). Of course, Leibniz would not have seen 
his metaphysical speculations as separate from his Christian duties, one of which is to 
seek out and spread the truth, especially edifying truths about God’s conduct. Smalridge, 
however, had a very marked preference for sticking to the word of Scripture, and for what 
could be easily (and hence safely) inferred from it82. He did not generally attempt to draw 
81 Smalridge to Caroline, 4 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 5v and 6r.
82 See for example his sermon entitled “The use of reason in religion” in: G. Smalridge, 
Sixty Sermons Preach’d on Several Occasions Publish’d from the Originals (Oxford, 
1724), pp. 338-348.
inferences from the nature of God, as Leibniz frequently did, and was clearly wary of 
such an approach83.
All in all, Smalridge’s assessment of the Theodicy is rather disappointing given 
that there is minimal engagement with the philosophical content of the book. This in itself 
is unsurprising, as Smalridge’s works (which are mostly in the form of sermons) suggest 
he had little to no interest in philosophical issues and questions: his focus was instead on 
theology and the governance of the church. He therefore would probably have felt out of 
his depth having to give his opinion on a book like the Theodicy.
Caroline subsequently forwarded Smalridge’s letter on to Leibniz, who very 
quickly prepared a rebuttal, which he sent to Caroline in a later dated 29 March 1715. In 
his response, Leibniz addresses Smalridge’s concerns one by one. It is clear that he was 
stung by the charge of obscurity, and he does his utmost to show that it has no basis. This 
is a summary of how he deals with the five complaints that together ground Smalridge’s 
charge of obscurity:
Smalridge’s complaint Leibniz’s response 29.iii.1715
Leibniz uses too many Scholastic terms 
which are devoid of sense
The terms are not devoid of sense at all, 
since they are given intelligible definitions.
Leibniz quotes Latin and Greek but 
does not translate them.
Admits to being “guilty” of this.
83 Smalridge did occasionally do this, however; e.g. inferring from God’s justice that 
some sinners would be punished more harshly in the future life than would others, 
depending on the severity of their crimes, and the extent to which they had already been 
punished in this life. See Smalridge, Sixty Sermons, p. 477.
Leibniz uses too many examples from 
mathematics and physics.
The examples are useful to those who 
understand these disciplines; those who do 
not may pass over the examples without 
detriment. (Also, such people may benefit 
from meditating on the examples.)
Leibniz often refers to previously-
published work which a reader may not 
have access to.
N/A [no response made]
Leibniz often digresses. The digressions are not so long that the 
reader loses the thread. Besides, others find 
the digressions a pleasing feature of the 
book, in that they enliven the discussion.
In addition, Leibniz reminds Caroline that she herself does not find the obscurity 
of the Theodicy to be too great, and he also notes that none of those who have reviewed 
the book in the various European journals and broadsheets have complained of its 
obscurity84. On the contrary; Leibniz insists that the Theodicy has in fact been praised for 
bringing clarity to obscure matters. In other words, Smalridge is in a minority of one. 
Leibniz also tells Caroline that he hopes an expanded version of the Theodicy will be 
produced, which would allow him to clarify whatever obscurities are brought to his 
84 On the list of journals that had not complained of the Theodicy’s obscurity, Leibniz included the 
Memoires pour l’histoire des sciences & des beaux Arts [a.k.a. Journal de Trévoux]. However, it was rather 
disingenuous of him to do this, as he was well aware that the editor of that journal had found some things in 
the book obscure, having been informed of this by a correspondent, Barthélémy des Bosses. See The 
Leibniz–Des Bosses Correspondence, p. 447. And Leibniz clearly acknowledged the charge, for to Des 
Bosses he wrote “I should very much like to know as soon as possible what the criticisms were from the 
Mémoires de Trévoux concerning the things that might appear erroneous or obscure in my book”. Leibniz 
to des Bosses, 21 April 1714, GP II, 486/The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, p. 327.
attention, as well as give him space to explain the Latin and Greek quotations. (Such an 
edition did not, of course, ever appear.)
In his letter of 29 March, Leibniz responds also to what he takes to be Smalridge’s 
final complaint, which is that in our present state of imperfection some objections about 
God’s goodness will always remain. However Leibniz construes Smalridge’s complaint 
as being simply that he [Leibniz] does not resolve all the objections. This leads him to say 
in response that while he has tried to be thorough, he would welcome being informed 
about any objections he has overlooked. But it is, he says, no objection that he cannot go 
into great detail about the reasons for permitting evil. In Leibniz’s own words:
“It seems he [Smalridge] believes there are objections I have still not resolved. I have endeavoured not to 
leave any out, and I will always be obliged to those who advise me of new ones. But one should not count 
as objections the oft-made complaints about the obscurity of the interior of things. For example, when 
reducing the objection against the permission of evil into form and responding to it, it is enough to show 
that God can have, and even does have, just reasons to permit it, but it is not necessary to explain these 
reasons in detail; and to exaggerate the extent of its impenetrability is not to make an objection. Every 
objection can be reduced into good form, and to give a form to this so-called objection, one would have to 
start with this false maxim: everything I cannot know, is not85”.
There are parallels here with Leibniz’s attitude towards the Christian mysteries, 
namely the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which he holds cannot be 
rationally demonstrated but can be shown to be coherent and defended against objections. 
Reason thus goes some way towards defending the Mysteries, and that is all that can be 
85 Leibniz to Caroline, 29 March 1715, LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 8r.
asked of it: it is no objection that reason cannot actually demonstrate the Mysteries. To 
Caroline, Leibniz suggests that much the same applies with evil as well: reason cannot 
furnish the explanation for God’s permission of it in any given case, but it is capable of 
removing the objections to God’s goodness drawn from the permission of evil, and this 
should be sufficient for our purposes86. As interesting a response as this is, I think it 
misses Smalridge’s point entirely; his complaint is not that the Theodicy fails to provide 
great detail about God’s reasons for permitting evil, but that there are objections that 
simply cannot be resolved while we are in our present state, and given that, the sort of 
metaphysical speculation Leibniz engages in is pointless. It is unfortunate that Leibniz 
did not respond to this charge, though if he had I suspect he would simply have denied 
Smalridge’s assumption that there are objections we cannot resolve while we are in our 
present state.
Conclusion
By way of bringing our study to a close, I would briefly like to speculate on what 
Leibniz himself would have thought about the reception of the Theodicy in England in the 
years leading up to his death. I think he would have been generally disappointed about its 
reception among the sort of key individuals whose approval he sought. While the book 
was received well by some of these individuals (Sharp, Wake), others appear not to have 
86 Leibniz argues the same way in a letter to Jacquelot, 6 October 1706, Grua I, 65-6.
read it at all (Burnet, Trotter), and some of those who had read it said little to nothing 
about it (Clarke). As a result, detailed studies of the book were few and far between, and 
when one was made it was philosophically insubstantial (Smalridge). But while the 
Theodicy’s reception among key individuals was not what Leibniz would have wanted it 
to be, we may suppose that he would have been happier with the response it got from the 
journals, or rather from the Memoirs of Literature, which was at the time the only English 
journal that would have reported on it. There it was subject to no fewer than four reports 
across four different issues, and it got several other mentions as well. The reports were 
clear and accurate, and above all positive, and their tone always respectful. It is just a 
shame that Leibniz probably only knew of them second-hand, and never got to read them 
himself.
Appendix: George Smalridge, Bishop of Bristol to Caroline (4 March 1715)
Manuscript: LH 4, 4, 1 Bl. 1r
Madam,
The book, which Your Royall Highness was pleas’d to put into my hands, when I 
was in town, I did, soon after my return to this place, peruse & consider with the best 
attention & the best application I could; and when I had gone through it, I did intend in 
obedience to Your Highnesses Commands to do my self the honour of giving You my 
thoughts concerning It. But I was taken with first a great heaviness, and afterwards an 
acute pain in my head, which hath for some weeks indespos’d me for writing, & which is 
not yet quite remov’d, tho’ I thank God it is in great measure abated. Were my head never 
so clear, I should not hope to write any thing worthy of Your Highnesses view; as it is 
now more than ordinarily weak and confus’d, I should be unpardonable in preferring to 
trouble Your Highness with my crude thoughts, if it were not still more inexcusable not to 
write at all, after Your Highness had condescended both to permit me so to do, & to 
signifie, that you expected to have heard from me.
My Lady Nottingham, when she first mention’d this book to me from Your Royal 
Highness, told me that you complain’d of the obscurity of it. I cannot but think that there 
is great reason for that complaint, for though it doth not become me to measure the extent 
of Your Highnesses abilities by the common standard, yet I believe I may, without too 
much presumption, say, that there is scarce any other person of your sex, who can 
thoroughly understand all the parts of this book.
The subject it self, of which the learned author treats is very nice & intricate, such as hath 
puzzled the wisest and ablest heads in all ages, and such as those who have most 
maturely weigh’d & consider’d, have most readily acknowledg’d to be attended with 
great, if not insuperable, difficulties. The author in treating of this subject hath employ’d 
many school-Forms, & metaphysical distinctions (such as absolute and hypotheticall 
necessity; the necessity of consequence, & of the consequent; the antecedent & 
consequent will of God; science of simple intelligence, of vision, & a middle science 
between these two; the physicall & metaphysicall communication of the soul with the 
body; and the like) which terms to persons not vers’d in the peculiar idiom & language of 
the Schools must of necessity be, what ever by some, who have been sufficiently skill’d 
in this sort of learning, they have been declar’d to be, mere jargon, empty words without 
any meaning, and utterly unintelligible.
The author hath also inserted several citations, from Greek & Latin authors, which he 
hath not translated into the language in which he writes, & which therefore a reader, who 
is not acquainted with Greek & Latin, can make nothing of, & you ought to know, not 
merely for the sake of the citations themselves, but also because without the 
understanding of these, what goes before or follows after cannot be well understood.
The author doth in severall places illustrate what he delivers by similitudes or examples, 
taken from mathematics or naturall philosophy; which resemblances, tho’ to persons 
skill’d in those sciences they may make the matters treated of clearer, yet to others 
unacquainted with those parts of learning, or who have not searcht into the depths of 
them, they must necessarily render what is said rather more, than less, obscure.
The author doth in severall places allude to books, which he had before publish’d, & 
which he supposes the reader of this to be well acquainted with; but it may happen that 
some readers may have never seen, or never consider’d those former discourses of his, & 
therefore may be the less prepar’d, & the less able to understand what is advanced in this.
The author hath in the prosecution of this subject made many, & sometimes very long 
digressions, which tho’ in themselves perhaps very usefull & instructive, yet, as they are 
brought in here, do interrupt the thread of the discourse, & thereby make it more difficult 
for the reader to carry on the pursuit of the principall subject in his thoughts.
For the reasons which have been alledg’d, & for many others, which might be offer’d, 
this book must to the generality of readers, at least in some parts of it, appear difficult and 
obscure.
But however, it is very easie for any intelligent reader with the least degree of attention to 
discover in it many excellent thoughts, a great compass of knowledge and learning, a 
close way of reasoning, a solidity of judgment, much candour towards those from whom 
the author differs & against whom he writes, & which must render it still more valuable 
to all serious and devout Christians, a true spirit of piety, an ardent zeal for the glory of 
God, for the vindicating his attributes, for inspiring the reader with a Love of Him, & for 
rectifying those falser notions of reason or about religion, which must have a very bad 
influence upon mens practise.
What this author hath at large alleg’d to prove that the permission of evil, & even of sin, 
is consistent with the goodness, wisdom, & holiness of God, will, I believe, appear 
satisfactory to all unprejudic’d and well-disposed minds; but still there will be room for 
cavils from those who are irreligiously inclin’d; & even sober, and pious persons, who 
are firmly persuaded of the divine attributes, may not be able fully & clearly to answer all 
the objections which may be brought against them.
Your Royal Highness will find the objection against the goodness of God drawn from the 
permission of evil consider’d, and answer’d by Archbishop Tillotson in the 3rd sermon of 
the 7th volume of the sermons publish’d after his death87.
87 Tillotson’s sermon (“The goodness of God”) can be found in J. Tillotson, The 
Remaining Discourses, on the Attributes of God, 7 vols. (London, 1700), VII: pp. 51-80.
The answers given there by the Archbishop, & more at large by the author of the learned 
book, which Your Royal Highness put into my hands, appear to me very solid, but were 
they less satisfactory than they are, I should not at all be stagger’d in my firm belief of 
the divine wisdom and goodness, tho’ I were not able to reconcile these with the 
sufferance of evil.
For since it is evident from experience, that God doth permit evil; & since it is 
demonstrable by reason & by revelation, that God is holy & good, these truths must be 
consistent one with the other, whether I by my shallow reasoning can make out their 
consistency or not.
The attempt of learned men to reconcile all appearances of repugnancy between such 
undoubted truths, as do seem to interfere with each other, is extremely laudable; and the 
reasons which they have offer’d to prove the permission of evil & the goodness of God to 
be fairly consistent, are much stronger than any which are brought to prove them 
repugnant; but still there may remain some difficulties not to be solv’d whilst we are in 
this state of imperfection, but reserv’d, till we are translated to a state of greater 
illumination.
In the mean-time it will become all humble, serious, & sober-minded Christians, rather to 
apply themselves to the diligent & conscientious practise of known duties, than to perplex 
their minds with an over-curious search into hidden & mysterious truths; as considering, 
that secret things belong to the Lord our God; but that those things which are reveal’d,  
belong to us, that we may do all the words of the law.
That God would direct Your Royal Highness by his Holy Spirit in the true knowledge of 
Him & of his Word; that He would confirm & strengthen you in all goodness, & pour 
down upon Your Regal Person & Family the choisest of his blessings, is the earnest 
prayer of,
Madam,
Your most dutifull, most obedient, &
most obliged servant
Christ-Church, Oxford
Mar. 4th 171488 George Bristol
88 It was English convention at the time to treat the months of January through March as 
belonging to the previous year. I would like to thank Monika Meier for pointing this out 
to me.
